BY ALEX VILLARINO
Last time I visited Mexico City I noticed something different in the streets. Instead of the traditional green, beaten-up VW beetles, taxicabs were brand new Nissan Tsuru models painted gold and red. In 2008 those green taxicabs were the most dangerous place for women in the city and stories about kidnapping and robberies in taxicabs were part of the citizens´ everyday lives.
The Office of Transportation (SETRAVI) implemented a program to legalize informal taxicabs in Mexico City in 2008. Before the program, there were 20,000 informal taxicabs driving in the streets. Their presence affected legal taxidrivers and the customers. The former had to share the market with unruly competitors that had lower costs and the latter were given poor services without safety provisions. In the worst possible scenario, even informal taxicabs were affected because they were forced to pay excessive costs in bribes and organization fees.
The government program legalized all informal taxicabs, increasing the official fleet by 18.34 percent.
While cities like Los Angeles and New York have a total fleet of taxicabs of less than 15,000; Mexico City’s accounts for 128,427 taxicabs after the legalization.
The program allowed the SETRAVI to create the first database on taxi plate-holders since the 1920’s. “Our new policy has been incredibly successful,” said Bernardo Navarro, an advisor to the Minister of Transportation. “Under the past situation everyone was worse-off,” Mr. Navarro said. “Now, that we have data about the owners, we can share with the Police Department all the data needed when a case of kidnapping or robbery has been reported,” he explained.
However, the program has been widely criticized by the opposition and the former legal drivers. They claim that the streets are too crowded with the inclusion of informal taxicabs. For them, legalizing informal taxi drivers sends the message that avoiding the law is beneficial. They also allege that the government has only benefited one of the informal taxicab organizations that had supported the Major and his party since the early 2000’s, Panteras del Frente Popular Francisco Villa A.C.
The relationship between Panteras and the governing Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD) became public during the blockade of Reforma Avenue that Andrés Manuel Lopez Obrador, Mexico City’s former mayor, organized after losing the national election in 2006. During the two months that the blockade lasted, Panteras supported the mobilization by transporting people and goods and using their taxicabs as barricades.
Although there is no official data, Agustín González, a former leader of Panteras, said that the organization had more than 13,000 members in 2008.
Panteras started their organization in the early 2000´s with informal taxidrivers that worked primarily in farther and deprived boroughs such as Gustavo A. Madero, Iztacalco, Iztapalapa, Tlalpan, and Milpa Alta. They got an amparo –a legal agreement that temporarily suspends state action against the individual – by alleging a violation of their right to employment. Amparos prevented informal taxi drivers from getting their cars towed and being arrested or fined by the police officers. According to Mr. González, the requirements for becoming a member included a membership fee of $250 to $400 USD and a weekly contribution of $20 to $30 USD.
When Panteras’ amparo expired, the police officers started to fine drivers and tow their cars. As a reaction, drivers were given cell phones used to request assistance when fined or towed. Assistance came in the form of many other informal drivers blocking with their cars the entrance of the tow pounds where they would force the police to release the car.
Along with violence and illegality came informal agreements with the authorities. In Panteras’ offices, their leaders will meet with transportation and police authorities to negotiate the law enforcement: Panteras would stop violence in exchange for tolerance. In practice, this meant that police officers would take drivers’ licenses when they didn’t meet the requirements established by the law. At the end of the day, police officers would stop by Panteras’ offices and request a “contribution” of $25 to $45 USD for each license. Informal drivers would also have to stop by the offices to recover their licenses contributing to the organization with twice as much as the leaders have paid the policemen. This was how Panteras became so popular and gained so much political power. They granted employment through bribery. And they brought votes and political support for the Party of the Democratic Revolution and the Mayor.
Out of the realm of politics, the program helped many informal taxi drivers that were not satisfied with the former situation. “Of course I wanted to legalize,” says Marcos Hernández, 52, who started driving a taxi 18 years ago. “I paid a lot more money in bribes and the black market of plates. Now, the government even helped me to buy my own car. They took my old car as down payment and I will finish paying it in 3 years.”
Mr. Hernández has worked as a bus driver since he was 25. He started driving for Ruta 100, the largest concession of public transportation at the time. He did not make much money but since he did not finish secondary school getting a better job was merely an illusion. After the privatization of Ruta 100 he was forced to work for another concession of buses where he met his friend Roberto. Roberto suggested that he start driving a taxicab after his shift in the bus. Since then, Mr. Hernández has worked 12 to 16 hours a day. He drives public buses for 8 hours and his taxicab for another four to six. As a bus driver he makes 500 dollars a month. As a taxi driver he makes another 400 dollars. “I don’t care about politics,” he says, “I was informal because that was the only way I could work to get the money I need to support my family. Becoming a pantera was the only way to do it. I just paid them what they asked and worked,” he said.