By REBECCA WEXLER
The small American church group that arrived at the Port au Prince airport just days after the devastating 7.0 magnitude January earthquake had nothing but the best intentions—literally. Armed with the healing power of God and the noble goal of providing comfort to the earthquake’s victims, they were responding to the most basic of humanitarian imperatives: But they had no supplies, no experience, and no plan.
As they disembarked into the chaos of the Port au Prince airfield wearing matching mission t-shirts, their lack of water, clothing, transportation, and supplies was immediately apparent. They would later find that in this disaster-wracked country, those resources were at the highest of premiums. Without even a ride from the airport, the group was left stranded until a professional aid worker offered to transport them into downtown Port au Prince.
“They seemed so passionate about helping, but they just showed up in the airport with no transportation or supplies and expected to be taken care of by the NGOs on the ground,” says Gillian Dunn, the director of emergency preparedness and response at the International Rescue Committee.
A number of professional aid organizations and relief workers see these stories of the average person trying to make a difference in Haiti as evidence of an inefficient and potentially dangerous trend in amateur disaster response.
According to Dunn, many aid organizations in Haiti—including her own—were forced to divert time and resources to feeding and housing these independent groups. “Our job wasn’t to use our vehicles to shuttle people around or to find jobs for them, it was to respond to this emergency and the needs of Haitians,” she said.
The story played out countless times in Haiti as hundreds of people armed with good will and noble goals, but not much else, flocked to the country to lend a hand to the relief efforts. The presence of these “everyday humanitarians” in the country has renewed debate about the role of amateurs in the increasingly professional world of humanitarian aid, and raised questions about the impact of the unaffiliated responders on aid coordination and resource distribution.
A 2010 report detailing the successes and shortcomings of the humanitarian response to the earthquake by the Inter-Agency Standing Committee—which represents a consortium of key U.N. partners and relief organizations—notes that Haiti “provided a striking example of the challenges of working with inexperienced organizations and inappropriate aid.”
The report highlights the difficulties of trying to incorporate individuals with no previous experience or training, no knowledge of the local language or customs, and no contextual understanding of how established aid groups work together in these environments into the relief efforts. It also suggests that many independent actors did more harm than good by diverting the resources and time of trained professionals, and working outside of the delicate coordination system that exists to ensure both efficiency and accountability.
The report cites one incident in which World Health Organization workers who were supposed to be delivering essential medical assistance to earthquake victims were forced instead to spend hours destroying stocks of unusable medications brought by an outside group.
Professional aid workers say that the problems created by amateur aid workers are not merely confined to bureaucratic inefficiency. In a particularly notorious example, 10 American Baptist Church members from Idaho were arrested two weeks after the earthquake for trying to bring 33 Haitian children they claimed were orphans into the Dominican Republic without proper documentation. In was later discovered that the children were not orphans at all.
Regardless of the church members’ objectives, professional aid workers say the story provides a striking example of the dangers of unaffiliated and independent groups operating without oversight or accountability under already chaotic circumstances. They add that even groups with less controversial missions in the country, like food distribution, can suffer from good intentions gone awry. Several Scientology groups in the Port au Prince, for example, seriously hindered care quality when they reportedly entered a hospital and provided food to pre-surgical patients, who are not supposed to eat or drink prior to surgery.
Krys Burnette, a Columbia University student pursuing a joint masters degree in International Affairs and Public Health, experienced firsthand the extreme side of the problem.
Burnette arrived in Haiti seven months after the earthquake as part of an organization called European Disaster Volunteers with plans to use her public health background to work on hygiene promotion at a small orphanage. Burnette and her teammates shared their housing unit with a young missionary, who had stayed in the country long after her missionary group had left and described her mission as “helping people.” While at the orphanage, Burnette noticed that one of the children’s feet was heavily bandaged. When she asked the missionary—who had been working at the orphanage for several months—what happened, the missionary proudly recounted that she had recently amputated the child’s infected big toe despite having no medical accreditation or surgical experience.
“I couldn’t believe it,” Burnette recalls. “The problem is that Haitians see that you are from the West and that you have resources and education and will trust anything you say. They aren’t going to ask for your medial license, they will trust that you can actually help them if you claim that you can.”
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The problem of amateur responders is not confined to Haiti, and has long been a thorn in the side of aid organizations trying to accomplish the monumental tasks of coordinating the massive flow of people and resources in disaster zones while saving lives and providing basic services. A handbook published by California disaster officials, for example, suggests that responders can expect roughly 50,000 “convergent volunteers” after a severe earthquake.
IRC’s Dunn says that Haiti attracted even more people and organizations than is usual in international disasters because of its proximity to the United States and the relative ease of getting there; commercial flights to the country became available just three days after the earthquake, facilitating the presence of roughly 400 organizations on the ground within one week.
Meanwhile, the complete and total destruction of the infrastructure in Port au Prince presented another set of unique challenges.
Saundra Schimmelpfennig, a long-time aid worker and author of the aid blog “Good Intentions are Not Enough,” says that whereas Indonesia’s tourist infrastructure and relatively undamaged roadways enabled the country to accommodate the huge surge of aid workers who arrived after the 2004 tsunami, the same wasn’t true in Haiti. In Haiti, there were no open restaurants or vacant hotel rooms to meet volunteer needs.
Those who were on the ground suggest that the already overcrowded and resource-depleted city was nearly impossible to navigate without the help of an established relief organization with supplies and experience, or previous links to the Haitian community.
In response to the challenges posed by amateur humanitarians, a growing number of professional organizations and aid workers are calling for changes that would require responders to be certified or registered before they could participate in disaster response.
The Inter-Agency Standing Committee report asks, for example, whether there is a point at which “the system can be too inclusive in coordination and planning,” and suggests it may be time to support quality over quantity in aid relief by “considering such strategies as NGO certification processes.”
Proponents of the proposals—which have taken a variety of forms—say the key to any certification process would be a proven record of specialized training, and proof of added value in a disaster situation. Such proof would likely include past experience in disaster zones at a minimum.
Critics of certification proposals, however, suggest that such requirements would unfairly punish small groups and start ups that are oftentimes more successful and efficient than larger, bureaucratic organizations that have their own set of shortcomings and challenges.
Dr. Reza Nabavian, a plastic, reconstructive, and burn surgeon who serves as the medical director for the non-profit Artists for Justice and Peace, says that his organization was able to spend the entire $3 million they raised for Haiti almost immediately.
“With larger organizations, small and critical projects like rebuilding a school or hospital get totally lost,” he says. “Working with a small group gave me the ability to hop on a plane immediately, walk into the hospital our organization was working with, and start treating patients. There was no red tape.”
While Dr. Nabavian’s training and expertise probably saved lives in Haiti, he suggests that he might not have gone if registration or certification were required first.
Meanwhile, it is often difficult to determine who is definitely helping and who is definitely not, given the scope of need after these types of events.
“My feeling is, as long as you came and you were willing to listen, you were able to help,” Dr. Nabavian says. “Who is to say that coming and holding a child’s hand is not meaningful or helpful work? You don’t have to be a doctor or professional to do that.”
Separately, some aid workers suggest that any restrictions concerning who is allowed to respond to disasters are an issue for national governments rather than NGOs or disaster relief organizations. The Japanese government, for example, allowed only very specific, highly specialized aid organizations into the country after the recent tsunami.
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While there are significant questions about aid worker certification, including who would lead the process and whether it would be enforceable, the proposals are a reflection of a growing desire on the part of professional Western aid workers to have their profession be considered just that.
“Not just anyone can do this work,” Dunn says. “Working in disaster zones is incredibly difficult for a number of reasons and requires a lot of specialized skills, experience, and familiarity with international standards and coordination systems,” she adds. Dunn says that these highly complex disaster environments can include complete physical destruction, the psychological trauma of seeing dead and injured people, and limited access to basic services,
Much of the criticisms about amateur aid workers have been levied at religious or missionary groups, but Dunn adds that even those with specialized skills like medical training may still be burdensome if they are unfamiliar with means of coordination and information sharing.
“Even though I know CPR, I wouldn’t show up in a hospital and expect to start contributing to patient care,” she says.
Humanitarian blogger Schimmelpfennig adds that enthusiasm alone is not enough to qualify someone to participate in disaster relief. While specialization can take a variety of forms—including grant writing, fundraising, and food distribution—she says that the effective aid worker is one who has educated him or herself about best practices, country dynamics and language, and the organization of international aid system.
Separately, many aid workers point out that basic skills like construction, rubble removal, and additional manpower are often those jobs that can be done by the local population as a way for them to both contribute to the rebuilding of their own community and regain their livelihood.
“After these types of disasters, people are looking for any job they can do, both as a way of making money and as a way of healing,” Dunn says. “When people flock to these disaster sites just to add another body for these types of jobs, they are also taking these jobs away from Haitians.”
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Despite well-placed concerns about the role of amateur volunteers, the message “don’t go, just send money,” can alienate people who feel that they can help in meaningful ways. Meanwhile, there is oftentimes an inherent disconnect between the way the media portrays the level of need in post-disaster countries, and the message of aid workers to stay home.
“Americans are born humanitarians,” Columbia’s Burnette says. “Everybody here has grown up with the message that they have the power to make a difference. It’s not surprising that many people see disasters as the natural way they can act on that.”
Professional aid workers say they hope to encourage this humanitarian spirit, but urge individuals to work with or through existing organizations that have experience in the field or experience in the affected country.
“It is wonderful that so many people are interested in this work, and many become professionals after coming to one of these countries as a volunteer,” Dunn says. “Definitely become involved, but please, don’t just go to Haiti.”